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FEATURE ARTICLES
Antitrust Implications of the Credit Card
Interchange Fee and an International
Survey
By Avril McKean Dieser*

I. Introduction
Although credit cards are ubiquitous and simple for
consumers to use, the operation of a credit card network is complex
and contains few network competitors. From the issuing of cards to
the network processing of a purchase, a credit card transaction goes
through many stages, and while some only take a couple of seconds,
others involve intricate accounting details and arrangements for fee
exchanges.'
The initiation of a credit card system requires substantial
resources to build a viable network; for example, there must be an
abundance of card users and banks, technology for clearing
transactions is required, and sharing of fees helps ensure everyone
benefits. 2 Once the system is established, additional resources are
needed to maintain and improve upon its security and operation.
However, one may expect that marginal operating costs would

* Ms. McKean Dieser is an Associate in the Corporate and Business Practice
Group in the Atlanta law office of Kilpatrick Stockton, L.L.P. and may be
contacted at amckeandieser@kilpatrickstockton.com.
See generally William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of TransactionalPaper:
Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 556 (1983) (discussing in detail

the function and operation of the interchange fee).
2 David A. Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?,
2000 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 215, 223 (2000) [hereinafter Balto, The Problem
of InterchangeFees].
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3
decrease as the operation expands and becomes more efficient.
MasterCard and Visa have created enormous webs of cardholders,
merchants and bank issuers for their credit cards. Discover, American
Express, and other international credit cards have also built
substantial networks for their cards. Although operating costs have
decreased over the years, the credit card industry, contrary to market
logic, has continually increased its charges.4 The MasterCard and
Visa associations have been at the forefront of increasing fees and
their resulting revenues, and have run into legal problems across the
globe. 5
Visa and MasterCard hold dominant positions in the credit
card industry, and they strive to ensure that they retain such
dominance by doing things such as increasing interchange fees,
which are paid to issuing banks, in order to entice issuing banks away
from wanting to offer other competing credit cards. Litigation has
grown against these companies over the past decade, and the antitrust
enforcement agencies, the courts and enforcement authorities in other
countries recognize the towering position that Visa and MasterCard
hold.6
As will be explained throughout this article, the size and the
non-transparent pricing practices of Visa and MasterCard have
caused concerns about monopoly power, anticompetitive practices,
and harm to consumers. Because of these concerns, Visa and
MasterCard will continue to face legal challenges across the globe.
While regulating the interchange fee may not be the most appropriate
solution, monitoring a cost-based interchange by requiring
transparent accountability may be the friendliest solution to all
parties. This article will discuss the antitrust implications of the credit
card interchange fee-the fee that acquiring banks pay to issuing
banks 7 -focusing predominantly on the Visa and MasterCard
associations.
This article will first give a brief history of the credit card
industry, explaining the creation of the Visa and MasterCard

3
4

Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees, supra note 2, at 223.
Id. at 216.

See generally id. (discussing legal issues facing the credit card associations
across the world).
6 This is apparent with the mounting litigation in the United States, the
regulation in Australia and the United Kingdom, and the recent European
Commission decisions, all to be discussed in this paper.
7 See infra Part IV (discussing the interchange fee).
5
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associations and the roles of American Express and Discover in the
credit card industry. Next, it will introduce the network and issuing
markets to set the stage for the discussion of the interchange fee. This
article will then explain in detail the function of the credit card
interchange fee, and the controversial role it plays with regard to the
Visa and MasterCard networks. Next this article will provide a
comparative perspective of the interchange fee and the manner in
which it is treated and regarded under various international
competition laws. Finally, this article will discuss the application of
U.S. antitrust laws to the interchange fee and how they may differ
from the competition laws of other nations. This article will conclude
with an analysis of Visa and MasterCard's control over the
interchange fee, how such control has placed the associations in
monopolistic positions, and suggest that antitrust authorities review
and monitor the harmful effects of the interchange fee.

II. History of the Credit Card Industry
A. A Brief Introduction to the Credit Card Industry
Since 1970, when credit cards began to increase dramatically
in popularity, the number of credit cards in personal households grew
from sixteen percent to sixty-eight percent by 1998.8 Two types of
credit cards available to consumers are proprietary general purpose
cards and general purpose bank cards. 9 Proprietary general purpose
cards, such as Discover Card, Diners Club and Carte Blanche, are
issued by single firms and can be used at many different and
unaffiliated merchants to make purchases.' 0 There are generally three
8 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 45 (2004)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the Visa and MasterCard association,
which came under attack by American Express for the association's practice of
dual governance, in addition to Visa and MasterCard's requirements of their
members to exclusively issue Visa and MasterCard's cards). These issues will not
be discussed in detail in this paper, but may be introduced to show Visa and
MasterCard's power in the market.

9 Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit
Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 645-46 (stating that these cards are
distinguished by the way in which they are issued).
10 Id. It should be noted, however, that with the Visa U.S.A. decision, those

cards presently considered proprietary in nature may begin to convert to a fourparty system as they entice banks to issue their cards. This has already occurred
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parties involved in a proprietary general purpose card transactionissuer, cardholder, and merchant. In this type of transaction, the
issuer both issues the cards and processes the purchases. 2 The future
of proprietary cards will likely begin to change with the recent
decision against Visa and MasterCard and the issuing of American
Express cards by MBNA, Corp. 13 The recent court decision will be
discussed throughout this paper and its effect will be noted in Section
V below, which discusses the antitrust issues facing the interchange
fees in the United States.
In contrast, general purpose bank cards are issued by financial
institutions that connect to the Visa and MasterCard bank
associations' operating network.' 4 With general purpose bank cards,
merchants use their own banks to obtain access to the network, rather
than having direct access to the network. 15 This bank credit card
system generally involves four parties-issuers, cardholders,
merchants and merchant banks.' A simple bank credit card
transaction involves a card-carrying customer who makes a purchase
from a merchant. Since the verification is completed electronically,
the merchant's clerk will determine immediately if the sale can be
processed. 17 The merchant then goes to her bank to collect the money
promised by the credit card, minus a merchant's fee. 18 The
merchant's bank will submit the transaction papers to the issuing
with American Express' partnership with MBNA Corp. MBNA Debuts American
Express-Branded
Cards,
FORBES.COM,
at
http://www.forbes.comaccociatedpress/feeds/ap/2004/11/05/ap 1636085.html

(Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter

FORBES.COMI.

1 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Economic Aspects of Payment
Card Systems and Antitrust Policy Toward Joint Ventures, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 861,

888 (1995).
12 id.
13 FORBES.COM,
14 Carlton

supra note 10.

& Frankel, supra note 9, at 646.

15 id.

16Id. at 647-48 (noting that merchants banks are also know as "merchant
acquiring members"); Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 888; Nat'l Bancard
Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd by, 779
F.2d 592 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986) [hereinafter
NaBANCO].
17See infra Part III (discussing the network market).
18Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 647-48 (noting that this merchant fee is
otherwise known as a "merchant discount rate").
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bank which will pay the merchant's bank for the amount provided to
the merchant, minus an interchange fee. 19 The
20 issuing bank will bill
the customer for the amount of the purchase.
B. The Union of Visa and MasterCard
Credit cards, as they are known today, evolved from the
established store credit and Travel and Entertainment cards ("T & E
Cards"). 2 1 T & E Cards appeared during World War II with the
mobilization of society. 22 American Express and Diners Club were at
the forefront, signing up a few retail facilities and nation-wide
merchants who offered such travel amenities as hotels and
restaurants. 23 The annual fee on these cards was generally high.224
When a card requires full payment with the receipt of the
billing statement, it is called a charge card.25 A credit card allows a
customer to pay only a portion of the bill upon receipt of the billing
statement, and carry over the remaining portion of the balance. 26 All
four major networks-American Express, Discover, MasterCard and
Visa-issue both credit cards and charge cards. 27
Visa began in the late 1950s with the introduction of the
BankAmericard issued by the Bank of America through a franchise
of seventy banks located in California.28 Bank of America granted a

19 Id.
20

Id. at 648 (noting that this example supplies a very simplified example of

the functioning of the bank credit card, it does not take into consideration other
factors such as annual card fees, finance charges and interest periods).
21 See Baxter, supra note 1, at 572 (explaining store credit as granting an
interest free credit period to customers who frequent the store and whose patronage
is highly valued).
22

Id. at 572-73.

23 Id.
24

Id. at 573.

25 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aft'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).
26 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
27 Id.

28 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 962 (D. Utah 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1152 (1995); NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1238.

456

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:4

license to these banks to issue the BankAmericard credit card.2 9
Through increases in technology and communications, by 1966 the
Bank of America embarked upon a national credit card program. 30
The banks that held licenses owned the credit cards they issued and
signed up local merchants to accept the cards, thereby creating a
BankAmericard network. 3' As the Bank of America network grew, a
for-profit, non-stock membership corporation called National
BankAmericard, Inc. ("NBI") was created in 1970.32 In 1974,
IBANCO, the international component of the BankAmericard, was
chartered by the international licensees of the Bank of America
network.33 In 1976, NBI changed its name to Visa U.S.A., returning
all rights in the BankAmericard name to the Bank of America, and
IBANCO became Visa International.34 As long as a bank met the
requirements for federal deposit insurance, it was eligible to become
a Visa member. 35 By 1983 there were approximately 13,400 Visa
members. 36 Today there are over 21,000 national and international
members. 37 While Visa began as a non-profit association, presently
it
38
operates as a non-stock, for profit membership organization.
MasterCard was established in 1966, several years after Visa,

29

NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1238.

30 id.

Id. (noting that Bank of America encouraged their licensee banks
throughout the nation to enlist non-issuing banks as agents in order to increase the
merchant base).
32 Id.
at
1238-39;
VISA
MEDIA
CENTER,
VISA
HISTORY,
at
http://usa.visa.conabout-visa/aboutvisausa/history.html (last visited May 24,
2005) [hereinafter VISA HISTORY].
33 VISA HISTORY, supra note 32.
31

34 Id.; see also NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1239 (discussing that many of the
changes during the early Visa card were regarding changes in the concept of
interchange fees).
35 NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1239; Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
36 NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1239.
37 VISA,

ABOUT

VISA
USA,
at
http://www.usa.visa.com/about-visa/aboutvisausa/index.html?it=h3Vabout-visa/
newsroom/statistics/index%2Ehtmll/img/nav/personal/nav cat aboutvisa usa%2E
gif#anchor_.5 (last visited June 3, 2005).
38 Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee, Commission Decision,
2002 O.J. (L 318) 17, 18 [hereinafter Commission Decision 2002].
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and it was initially called Interbank Card Association ("ICA").3 9 In
1969, ICA became known as Master Charge, and in 1979 the name
changed to MasterCard. 40 ICA/Master Charge began as a
membership corporation and the credit card was promoted b'
individual banks as well as regional banking associations.
Currently, MasterCard has approximately 25,000 members worldwide and operates as a private share corporation.42
The relationship between Visa and MasterCard dates back to
1973 when the Worthen bank, an issuin member of the Visa system,
began to issue cards for MasterCard.
In response to Worthen's
actions, Visa instituted By-law 2.16, which essentially prohibited its
issuing banks from issuing cards on any other network and also
prohibited acquiring banks, those banks that sign on merchants and
generally handle the merchants' processing, from participating as
issuing banks with other networks. 4 The Eighth Circuit stated that
the By-law preventing issuing members from becoming issuing
members of another credit card network is not a per se violation of
the antitrust laws.4 5
After the Department of Justice ("DOJ") refused to get
involved with supporting the notion that dual issuing is an antitrust
violation, Visa settled with Worthen and allowed its members to
become members of MasterCard.4 6 Visa's Board of Directors also
permitted dual governance by allowing MasterCard members to
39 MASTERCARD
CORPORATE

INTERNATIONAL,
FACT

MASTERCARD
SHEET

INTERNATIONAL
1,
at

http://www.mastercardintl.com/newsroom/company_fact.html (last visited June 3,
2005) [hereinafter MASTERCARD FACT SHEET].
4 Id.
41 Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 121
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
42 MASTERCARD FACT SHEET, supra note 39; Press Release, MasterCard
International, MasterCard Members Approve Conversion To A Private Shareholder
Corporation (on file with the Loyola Consumer Law Review).
43 Worthen, 485 F.2d at 121.
44 Id. at 122-23 (noting that at this time Interbank/Master Charge did not have
the same type of prohibition on issuing).
45 Id. at 129-30.
46 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 963 (D. Utah 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1152 (1995) (noting that when this occurred, many banks became members of both
Visa and MasterCard).
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participate in the governance of the Visa association, and permitting
Visa members to participate in the governance of the MasterCard
association.47 Although both membership associations operate as a
joint venture, Visa and MasterCard contend that they compete
with
48
each other, in addition to other credit cards in the market.
C. The Long-Lasting American Express Card and the Entry of
Discover
In 1850 American Express made its debut as a joint stock
association and in 1965 became a New York corporation. American
Express made its Initial Public Offering on the New York Stock
Exchange on May 18, 1977.50 In 1999, American Express issued the
largest number of credit and charge cards and had a transaction
volume of $186 billion. 5 152The company is profitable and consistently
meets its earning targets.
Unlike American Express, Discover is a relatively new
proprietary general purpose card. The Discover Card dawned in
Atlanta, Georgia in late 1985, and made its national issuing debut in
1986. 53 In 1999, based on a transaction volume of $70.98 billion,
Discover was the fifth largest issuer, and, with its forty-eight million
cards outstanding, it ranked among the top three credit card issuers.54
As will be discussed below, Discover unsuccessfully
attempted to
55
join the Visa association in 1988 and again in 1990.

47 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aft'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).
(explaining that this structure became known as "governance duality").
48 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47.
49 AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY INVESTOR RELATIONS, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS
1,
at

http://ir.americanexpress.com/ireye/ir-site.zhtml?ticker=axp&script= 1801 &layout
=7 (last visited June 3, 2005) [hereinafter INVESTOR RELATIONS].
50 id.
51 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
52

id.

" SCFCILC,Inc, 819 F. Supp. at 963.
54 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
51 SCFC ILC, Inc, 819 F. Supp. at 963-65. This case was the result of

Discover's attempt to join Visa, and the holding prevented Discover from
becoming a member of the MasterCard or Visa association.
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III. The Credit Card Markets and Operations
A. The Network Systems Market
Four credit card networks dominate in the United States: Visa,
MasterCard, American Express and Discover. 5 6 In order to create a
functional and thriving credit card network, there must be an
adequate number of cardholders and merchants willing to use and
accept the cards. 57 A credit card company attracts a merchant by
providing a substantial customer base, favorable merchant discount
58
rates, and reliable and efficient means of processing transactions.
Customers are attracted to credit cards when there is a substantial
merchant base that will accept their cards, when there is a low or no
the credit card company offers other royalties
annual fee and when
59
such as sky miles.
Because of the elevated costs required to establish a network,
it is difficult for a new network to enter and compete directly with
those that are well-established. 6 0 Network costs usually include
branding the cards, advertising, advancing technology, and other
61
activities of the business that increase merchants and cardholders.
The first-established network has advantages because customers are
already comfortable using its cards and many banks and retailers
already have the necessary processing equipment. 62 In order for a
new network to effectively compete, it must entice customers to want
to use its card and it must attempt to duplicate equipment used by
retailers and banks, or somehow gain access to the technology

David A. Balto, The VISA-MasterCard Decision and its Implications for
High Tech Markets, 1290 P.L.I. CORP. 69, 88 (2002) [hereinafter Balto, VISAMasterCardDecision].
5' David A. Balto, Antitrust and Credit Card Joint Ventures, 47 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 266, 266-67 (1993) [hereinafter Balto, CreditCardJoint Ventures].
58 Id. at 267. The merchant discount rate is the amount paid by the merchant to
56

its bank (the acquiring bank) for the processing of the merchant's transactional
paper. Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 647.
5' B alto, Credit Card Joint Ventures, supra note 57, at 267.
60

Don Cruickshank,

COMPETITION IN

U.K.

BANKING:

61

(March 2000).
Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 865.

62

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.44.

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER 3.44

A

REPORT TO THE
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already in use. 63 Because of the strength exhibited by these types of
networks, the number of competitors remains small and entry barriers
are generally high. 64 With the introduction of duality between the
Visa and MasterCard associations, the level of intersystem
65
competition was stunted until the introduction of the Discover Card.
When Discover entered the market, it offered its credit card to
consumers with no annual fee and a one percent rebate on
purchases. For its merchants, Discover imposed a small merchant
discount relative to that charged by Visa and MasterCard.67
Introduction of the Discover Card, thereafter, ignited a fire under
Visa and MasterCard forcing them to become more competitive in
the market.68
B. Operating the Networks
Under the four-party network, a central network system must
be established to process inter-member transactions, including
approval, consolidation, and settlement of member transactions. 69 In
order for the network system to properly function, members must
accept and adhere to common rules of costs and risks that involve
different parties, for example cardholders, merchants, acquirers, and
issuers, who are necessary for a successful transaction. 70 These
common rules enable all the players to understand their roles in the
See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341-42
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aft'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 45
(2004) (noting that Visa's CEO described establishing a new network as a
",monumental' task").
64 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp 2d at 341-42.
63

Balto, Credit Card Joint Ventures, supra note 57, at 267 (noting that little
competition ensued between Visa and MasterCard during the 1970s and early
1980s, and the products offered by each association were highly similar).
65

66 Id. (explaining that rebates were practically unheard of until Discover
introduced them).
67

id.

Id. (stating that Visa and MasterCard were forced to lower their interchange
fees enabling the issuing banks to lower merchant discounts to compete with
Discover).
69 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at
888.
68

70 Id.; David A. Balto, Creating a Payment System Network: The Tie that
Binds or an HonorablePeace?, 55 Bus. LAW 1391, 1391 (2000) [hereinafter Balto,

Creating a Payment System Network].
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use of the credit card; for instance, the rules may describe what steps
will be taken if a cardholder does not pay the issuer for the charges
made.71 Unfortunately, when a network acquires a position of power,
the benefits of accepting common rules begin to diminish and then
those rules begin to act as barriers to new and possibly more efficient
networks. 72 For example, the rule that was declared anti-competitive
in Visa, U.S.A, which required all Visa members to refrain from
issuing cards on any other network,
73 excluded other credit cards from
prospering or entering the market.
In addition to requiring network members to follow rules and
participate in common activities for its optimal performance, the
network must also have the technological capacity to operate on a
functional level. Until 1996, American Express, like Discover, had a
single-issuer network whereby one firm issued cards for the whole of
the network. 74 In processing transactions for single-firm issuers, the
network connects the merchant directly with the issuer. 75 In 1996,
however, American Express began inviting banking members of the
Visa and MasterCard associations to issue American Express Cards
in an attempt to move toward a four-party system. 76 Since the finality
of the Visa, U.S.A. lawsuit, Visa and MasterCard members may now
issue competing credit cards. 77 Following the suit, in November
2004, American Express introduced its first bank-partnership card
issued in the United States by MBNA, Corp. 78 Because this deviates
substantially from the way the credit card industry, as described
above, has operated over the past several decades, it is inevitable that
these industry changes will alter the dynamics of both the network
and issuing sides of the credit card industry.
71 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 888 (noting that another example
is

a rule that specifies the responsible party in the case of charges placed on a stolen
credit card).
72 Balto, Creatinga Payment System Network, supra note 70, at 1391.
3 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 329, 406 (S.D.N.Y.

2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).
74 Visa U.S.A., 163, F. Supp. 2d at 380.
71 See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 646.
76 See Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 380-82 (noting that when American
Express attempted to enlist MasterCard and Visa associations members, both Visa
and MasterCard created By-laws stopping American Express).
77 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
78 FORBES.COM, supra note 10.
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In the four-party card system, the network provides the
technology for the authorization and clearing of transactions among
the parties.7 9 When a cardholder makes a purchase at a merchant's
store, the transaction is verified and either approved or denied
80
through the use of the electronic services provided by the networks.
The transaction that occurs between the merchant and its bank, and
then the merchant's bank and the issuing bank, also lies under the
shield of the network because the network provides protection against
fraud and the guarantee of funds owed. In situations where the
merchant's bank and the issuing bank are the same, the transaction
that occurs is called an "on us" transaction. 82 With an "on us"
transaction, no transactional paper is exchanged and, therefore, no
interchange fee is involved. 83 However the transactions are
structured, either "on us" or through the use of an interchange, the
network allows the entire system to function.
C. The Issuing Market
In addition to the network market, there is also a market for
the issuing of cards. 84 In the Visa and MasterCard associations,
85
neither association actually issues card. 8 Member banks issue cards
while the association provides services such as advertising and
technologically advanced processing to members.86 At the issuing
market level of competition, the Visa and MasterCard association
members compete with the proprietary card firms such as American
Express and Discover. 87 While the networks cover the costs of
advertising and processing credit card transactions, the issuing banks
or firms are responsible for circulating their credit cards and
79 Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 646; Evans & Schmalensee, supra note

11, at 888-89.
80 Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 646-47.
81 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 889-90.
82 NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1240.
83 Id.

84 In SCFC ILC, Inc., both Visa and Discover agreed that the issuing market
was the relevant market for the purposes of the case. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA,
Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 966 (10th Cir. 1994).
85 SCFCILC, Inc., 36 F. 3d at 966.
86 Id.

87 Id. at 966-69.

2005]

Antitrust Law and the Credit CardInterchange Fee

463

promoting cardholder use and satisfaction.

IV. The Credit Card Interchange Fee
The interchange fee is the fee paid by the acquiring bank to
the issuing bank for the exchange of the transactional paper." The
role of the interchange fee in the United States, and in some countries
abroad, has changed over time. Some changes reflect costs, while
others are simply revenue raising tools. Lack of transparency poses
one of the greatest problems that most countries have with the
interchange fee.
A. The Interchange Fee, as an Economic Tool, was Established to
Cover the Costs of Building the Credit Card Network
1. The Initial Purpose of the Interchange Fee
The credit card interchange began with NBI, the predecessor
to Visa through which the merchant's bank would "interchange" its
transactional paper with the issuing bank. 89 The fee that accompanied
this interchange was presented to potential issuing and merchant
banks as the costs for participating in and establishing the network. 90
In the early stages of the interchange fee, only banks performed the
functions of card issuing and processing merchant's transactions so
that the fee appeared to be nothing more than a cost-based transfer of
funds. 91 This theory of cost-based transfer remains true with threeparty systems where the interchange fee, if charged, would act as an
internal transfer of funds within the same firm.9 2
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, non-financial institutions
began to participate in the Visa scheme by contracting with either

88

Baxter, supra note 1, at 575-76.

See Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119,
121 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974)(finding that this
transactional paper was derived from the sales draft collected from the customer by
the merchant, and the merchant would sell the sales draft to its bank creating the
transactional paper).
90 Balto, The Problem of InterchangeFees, supra note 2, at 217.
89

91 Id.
92

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.34.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:4

merchant banks or issuing banks as processors. 93 One of these early
non-financial institutions questioned payment of the interchange fee
and the issue landed in court.9 4

2. NaBANCO
NaBANCO v. Visa, U.S.A. has been the only case to directly
challenge the credit card interchange fee in the federal courts.95 In the
case, NaBANCO complained that the requirement to pay the
interchange fee did not allow them to equally compete for merchant
business with other Visa members that were able to both issue and
acquire utilizin§ "on us" transactions, thereby avoiding the
interchange fee. 9 NaBANCO claimed that because it was not a Visa

member and was required to route through the Visa system for an7
interchange transaction, it was requiredto pay the interchange fee.
The antitrust apex of NaBANCO's98claim was that the interchange fee
constituted horizontal price fixing.
The court, under a rule of reason analysis, held that the
interchange fee was not horizontal price fixing, but rather a means for
99
cost and risk sharing between Visa acquiring and issuing members.
This fee was necessary to cover costs such as the risk of fraud, loss,
floating funds, and issuing the cards.100 The court also found that the
relevant market was the market for all 1payment services, rather than
the general purpose credit card market.
In response to NaBANCO's questioning of Visa's intent in
setting its interchange fee, the court revealed that while the method
for calculating the fee was "not perfect
93

NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1239.

94

Id. at 1231.

...

,"

it was "within the

95 id.
96

Id. at 1240.

97 Id. at 1240-41.
98

NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1240-41 (noting that both "on us" and

interchange fee transaction involved the same costs for processing, Nat'l Bancard
Corp. questioned Visa's intent and reasoning for setting the interchange fee).
99 See id. at 1261 (stating that to prohibit the use of the interchange fee would
harm interbrand competition and thus violate the antitrust laws).
10oBalto, The Problem of Interchange Fees, supra note 2, at 217.
101

See NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1259 (including in its payment services

cash, checks, travelers cheques, ATM cards, and etc.).
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bounds of sound business judgment."' 102 The method used had been in
place since 1973 and was designed by the accounting firm of Arthur
Andersen. 103 The best methodology decided upon by Visa and Arthur
Andersen was a cost-based method which calculated average costs
across the entire system. 10 4 This methodology was reviewed again in
1980 and remained cost-based including average costs across the
system. 0 5 To date, the actual calculating of the interchange fee
remains a business secret for the Visa and MasterCard associations,
and therefore, acquiring banks, merchants and consumers have no
fair assessment of whether the
interchange fee is based upon the
06
operating costs of the system.'
The court brushed aside NaBANCO's claim of horizontal
price fixing, stating that whether or not Visa was literally fixing
prices, it was not doing so "in any meaningful sense of the word."
The court went on to state that market forces could not have set the
interchange fee for several reasons, but specifically named only free
riding. °8 The court ultimately held, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed,
that Visa may fix a 0system-wide transfer price in order to efficiently
operate its network.'
Today it is unlikely that a court would define the relevant
market as broadly as the court in NaBANCO. 110 The industry has
moved from a predominantly paper based system with higher risks of
fraud and loss, to an electronic processing system where the
102

Id. at 1262.

103Id.

(noting that Arthur Andersen was given a carte blanche to design the
method to be used to calculate the interchange fee).
104Id.
105

Id.

106

Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees, supra note 2, at 216.

'07

NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1264.

108

Id. Free riding is the opportunistic behavior on the belabored product of

another. Id.
109 Id.

110 See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335-38

(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 45
(2004)(defining the relevant markets as the markets for general purpose cards and
general purpose network services); Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees, supra
note 2, at 220 (noting that a higher interchange fee will not easily send consumers
and merchants to other forms of payments); see also Commission Decision 2001,
2001 O.J. (L 293) 31, 32. [hereinafter Commission Decision 2001] (including in
the relevant market all types of payment cards and excluding cash and checks).
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transactional risk has been substantially lowered."' While scholars
differ on the analysis and outcome of NaBANCO, all would probably
agree that the role of the interchange fee in the United States has
transformed." 12
3. The Function of Interchange Fees Today
When companies are engaged in a joint venture, as Visa and
MasterCard, the antitrust laws recognize that collective price setting
may be necessary for the efficient functioning of the venture. 1" 3 The
interchange fees set by Visa and MasterCard can take three different
theoretical forms. 1 4 A positive interchange fee is a transfer of funds
from the acquiring bank to the issuing bank, a negative interchange
fee causes funds to transfer from the issuing bank to the acquiring
bank, and in the case where no funds are transferred, then there is a
zero interchange fee. 1 5 Presently, the Visa and MasterCard joint
venture operates with a positive interchange
fee whereby the
6
fee."
the
bank
issuing
the
pays
bank
acquiring
While NaBANCO found, and some scholars agree, that the
interchange fee is necessary to offset the costs of operating the credit
card system, other scholars argue that in a competitive market the
interchange fee is unnecessary to compensate issuing banks for
costs."17 Some scholars argue that in a market of free competition,
prices will adjust with costs and the interchange fee is not necessary
to compensate an issuing bank for incurred costs." 8 Issuers would

11I
112

Balto, The Problem of InterchangeFees, supra note 2, at 218-19.
David A. Balto, Dennis W. Carlton, & Alan S. Frankel have written with

skepticism toward the decision in NaBANCO, while David S. Evans and Richard
Schmalensee, who received financial support from Visa to compose their joint
article, ardently support the decision in NaBANCO. Balto, The Problem of
Interchange Fees, supra note 2, at 223; Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 646;
Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 888.
113 Balto, The Problem of Interchange Fees, supra
note 2, at 216.
114

Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 11, at 890.

115 Id.

116 Id.

(noting that the interchange fee is automatically charged when
processing is performed through Visa Base II clearinghouse system).
117 Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 656.
118 Id.
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9
then recoup their expenses from card users."
Several scholars have presented different theories regarding
the setting of the interchange fee. Although the economic literature
available to policy makers seeking to understand the function of the
interchange fee is evolving, more economists are realizing a need to
study and prepare models to define the socially and privately optimal
interchange fee.' 20 Visa and MasterCard may use several different
methods to set their interchange fees. One method used by Visa is to
assess the costs incurred by the issuing and acquiring banks, and to
set the interchange fee so that issuing banks (which are considered
the high-cost component of the system) receive revenues from the
acquirin2 banks (which are considered the low-cost component of the
system). 21 MasterCard, on the other hand, uses methodologies that
allow the issuers to recover servicing costs from the acquirers and
merchants. 22 In other words, acquirers, merchants and consumers are
subsidizing the cost of the network services and providing profits to
MasterCard's member banks.
William F. Baxter, former Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, wrote an influential
analysis regarding the setting of interchange fees in credit card
systems. 123 Baxter points out that the income merchants receive from
cardholder purchases will more than cover the merchants' costs,
while income received by card issuers from card holders is not
sufficient to cover issuing Costs. 124 Therefore, in order to achieve
equilibrium in credit card interchange, the surplus gained by the

119 Id.
120

Baxter, supra note 1; Julian Wright, The Determinants of Optimal

Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, LII J. OF INDUS. ECON. 1 (2002); Richard
Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, L J. OF INDUS. ECON. 103

(2002); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets, Working Paper (2001); Sujit Chakravorti & Ted To, A Theory of Credit
Card,Working Paper (2002); Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, The Neutrality of
Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, 3 ToPics IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POLICY 1
(2002) [hereinafter Gans & King, Neutrality of Interchange Fees] (unpublished
sources on file with author).
121 Wright, supra note 120, at n.2 (citing H. Chang & David S. Evans, The
Competitive Effects of the Collective Setting of Interchange Fees by Payment Card
Systems, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 641-677 (2000)).
122 Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, Approaches to Regulating Interchange
Fees in Payment Systems, REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 125, 126-27 (2003).
123 Baxter, supra note 1, at 558.
124

Id. at 575.
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merchant should be passed on to make up the deficit incurred by the
issuer. 125 This would, in Baxter's opinion, create an "optimum
transfer fee."126 His model, however, assumes perfect competition. 17
Several other scholars have devised models to determine the
optimal interchange fee by taking into consideration such conditions
as imperfect competition, demand elasticities, relationships between
consumers and merchants, optimizing output for profit and consumer
welfare, and finding a neutral fee.1 28 The commonality between these
scholars is the attempt to define an interchange fee that in some way
benefits each party without harming competition or consumers.
B. The Interchange Fee in the United States Has Gone Above and
Beyond the Cost of Duty
The current Visa interchange fee in the United States ranges
from .95% to just over 2.63%. 129 In addition to the interchange fee,
acquirers also pay an assessment fee per transaction to the card
associations. 13 When setting their interchange rates Visa and
MasterCard consider each other's interchange rates first, then they
analyze the merchant discount rates collected by American Express
and Discover.1 31 The MasterCard and Visa associations will generally
review their interchange rates in the
32 spring and the fall to determine
whether the rates need adjusting.1
Just recently, MasterCard and Visa raised their interchange
125

Baxter, supra note 1, at 575.

Id. at 576 (implying that a transfer should bring the two parties back to
equilibrium).
126

127Gans & King, Neutrality ofInterchangeFees, supra note
120, at 8.

128Wright, supra note 120; Schmalensee, supra note 120; Rochet
& Tirole,
supra note 120; Chakravorti & To, supra note 120; Gans & King, Neutrality of
InterchangeFees, supra note 120.
129 SHIFT
4,
CURRENT
VISA
INTERCHANGE
FEES,
at
http://www.shift4.com/CCC-interchange.cfm (last visited June 3, 2005); CAPITAL
Q NEWS PAGE at http://www.capitalq.com/qtips/news.html (last modified Dec. 31,
2004) [hereinafter CAPITAL Q].

"' NOVA
NETWORK,
INTERCHANGE
Q
&
A,
at
https://www.merchantconnect.com (2002) [hereinafter NOVA NETWORK]; CAPITAL

Q, supra note 129.
131United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 45 (2004).
132 NOVA NETWORK, supra note 130.
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133
fees for consumer and corporate credit cards in the United States.
MasterCard stated that the increased rates are intended to balance
acquiring and issuing in this complicated payment market.' 34 Visa
stated that its increased fee is intended to match MasterCard's
increase and to compete with the newly ioined partnership between
American Express and MBNA Bank. 35 In 1999, the average
interchange fee charged by American Express was 2.73% while Visa
and MasterCard were offering approximately 2.0%.136
In 2002, a similar scenario occurred when MasterCard
increased its rate in the spring and then Visa increased its rate in the
fall, creating for merchants a double rate increase for that year. 137 A
rate increase also occurred in 2000, and the associations defended
that increase by stating that they incurred increased costs; however,
specific information relating to the reason of the increase was kept
secret by the associations. 1 38 These rate increases have puzzled
merchant acquirers, merchants and some scholars because of the
economic assumption that as the costs of processing and data
communications decreases, the interchange fees should also
decrease.' 39 However, the opposite continues to occur without
explanation.
As the interchange fee continues to increase, so do the prices
consumers pay for goods. 140 Because the interchange fee is paid by
acquiring banks, the fee itself is passed to the merchants via the
merchant discount, and then the merchant passes the fee on to
customers in higher prices. 141 Therefore, cash customers are
subsidizing credit card customers, and credit card customers are
reaping the benefits of higher interchange fees through rebates and

133 CAPITAL Q,
134

Id.

135

Id.

supra note 129.

136 See BTN ONLINE.COM, Amex Signs First U.S. Issuer (Feb. 9, 2004) (on file

with author).
137 NOVA NETWORK, supra note

130.

138Balto, Creating a Payment System Network, supra note 70, at 1395.

See id. (noting that Visa and MasterCard claim that fees have increased
because of increased costs; however, as Balto points out, processing fees have
continually fallen).
140 Gans & King, Neutrality of Interchange Fees, supra note 120, at 3-4.
139

141 Carlton

& Frankel, supra note 9, at 660-61.
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42
other incentives presented to them by issuing banks. 1
Ideally, if merchants were allowed to place a surcharge on
credit card purchases, then the interchange fee would find a neutral
ground. In such a situation the merchant would be collecting from
credit card users the charge that the merchant pays in the form of the
merchant discount and only credit customers would pay to take
advantage of the credit card network. 14 3 This is another version of
showing how the interchange fee may have no effect if it is
eliminated in a well-established network. In this case, the cardholder
pays the merchant a surcharge amount that equals the interchange fee
that the merchant ultimately pays to the issuer. The seemingly more
practical route would require the cardholder to simply pay a fee to the
issuer for services the cardholder receives.
Presently, in the United States, Visa and MasterCard impose a
"no-surcharge" rule, which prohibits merchants from charging credit
card customers an additional fee for using credit cards. 144 While this
rule is permissible in the United States, other countries prohibit such
a restriction on merchants. 45 If merchants collectively apply a
surcharge to credit card purchases, competition by other forms of
payments would heat up.r46 If other payment options make a strong
come-back and enter into the payment systems market that Visa and
MasterCard have created, the associations would be forced to lower
interchange fees, which would in turn lower merchant fees and
encourage merchants to stop passing their fee onto to credit card

142

Carlton & Frankel, supra note 9, at 660-61.

Gans & King, Neutrality of InterchangeFees, supra note 120, at 5, 10.
144 Balto, Creating a Payment System Network, supra note 70, at 1396 (noting
that the fee charged to customers is called a surcharge).
145 For example, presently the Netherlands and Sweden do not allow the credit
143

card associations to impose no-surcharge rules. Chakravorti & To, supra note 120,
at n.4. Likewise, the United Kingdom prohibited the no-surcharge rule in 1990.
EUROPA, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU ANTITRUST LAW AND THEIR POTENTIAL
IMPACT
ON
THE
BANKING
SECTOR
OF
THE
CZECH
5,
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp 1998_016_en.html
(Apr.
28, 1998). Just recently in 2002, the Reserve Bank of Australia ended the nosurcharge policy. AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSIONMEDIA RELEASES, ACCC WELCOMES RESERVE BANK CREDIT CARD REFORMS
(2002) [hereinafter ACCC Study]. However, the Commission of the European
Communities has ruled that the no-surcharge rule does not harm competition and
may be enforced. Commission Decision 2002, supra note 38, at 34-35.
'46

See Balto, Creatinga Payment System Network, supra note 70, at 1396.
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customers. 147
In the year 2000, the top ten issuers of credit cards managed
about eighty percent of receivables on bank cards. 148 In that same
year Visa held 47% of the U.S. market share, MasterCard held
149
28.4%, American Express held 17.5%, and Discover held 7.1%.
The interchange fees in 2000 were figured to be on average 1.7% of
$768.2 billion in purchase volume as compared with the 1999 figure
of 1.6% on $681.6 billion.' 50 In 2000, the interchange fee accounted
for 14.4% of the revenues earned by credit cards. 15 1 While credit card
expenses in 2000 were $75.8 billion, revenues exceeded $90.9
billion, meaning that the interchange fee does more than simply cover
expenses. 152 In 2004 it was estimated that interchange fees accounted
53
for $24 billion in annual revenues for credit card issuing banks.'
C. International Perspective of the Interchange Fee
Since credit card use has swept across the world, the
interchange fee has become a debated issue in many countries where
credit cards proliferate. In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair
Trading has been given regulatory authority to oversee the setting of

This statement assumes that if there were no no-surcharge rule, then
merchants would pass their merchant fees on to credit card customer via a
surcharge, although it is uncertain whether merchants would actually pass their fee
along in this manner. Gans and King suggest that an alteration, regulation for
example, of the interchange fee will not in any way affect competition or the
operation of the credit card system unless the domino effect described here actually
occurs-every player must adjust her prices. Gans & King, Neutrality of
Interchange Fees, supra note 120, at 12. Gans and King conclude in their study that
the only way in which banks may profit from the interchange is when both
imperfect merchant competition exists, and when a no-surcharge applies. Id. at 25.
147

148 James

J. Daly,

Profitability,CREDIT CARD
file with author).

CCM's Annual Report: Tenuous Gains in Card
MANAGEMENT, CARD FORUM & ExPo (May 2001) (on

149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.

152

Id. (noting that these 2000 figures led to a 2.1% tax return on assets in that

year, making it a very profitable year for credit cards).
153

Kenneth Posner & Athina Meehan, Attacking the Death Star, Morgan

Stanley Equity Research, at 2 (Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Attacking the Death

Star].
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the interchange fee.' 5 4 The European Commission still allows the
credit card associations to set their interchange fees in Europe so long
as there is a cap on the multilateral interchange levels.' 55 In Australia,
the Reserve Bank of Australia has recently begun regulating the
interchange fee. 1 56 The interchange fee in other countries such as
Canada, Israel, Poland and South Africa are also being scrutinized by
policy makers. 157 This section will explore the experience of
interchange fees in selected countries.
1. England
In March 2000, a banking study (the "Cruickshank Report" or
"Report") in the United Kingdom was submitted to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer calling for a revision in the interchange fee.' 58 The
Report revealed many faults with the interchange payment for credit
card schemes.1 59Among the problems identified were the ability of
issuing banks to increase interchange fees above actual costs and the
use of interchange fees to inhibit new entry into the credit card
networks.
The Report determined that Visa, MasterCard, and
Switch collectively
maintained market power over retailers and
61
consumers.
The credit card schemes in the U.K. are similar to the U.S. in
that they are member associations made up of, and controlled by,
their member banks.' 62 The associations are non-profit organizations
that may own, control and share certain capital infrastructures such as
telecommunication networks and clearing house systems. 163 Also,
154

Wright, supra note 120, at 2.

155

Id.

156

Id.;

AUSTRALIAN

COMPETITION AND

CONSUMER

COMMISSION,

MEDIA

(Aug. 27, 2002) (on filed with author).
Wright, supra note 120, at 2.

RELEASES
157
158

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.44.

159

The report uses the term "scheme" to represent the credit card "network;"

these terms will be interchangeable for this Part.
160 Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.97.
161

Id. at 3.100. Switch is one of two debit card schemes in the U.K.; the other

scheme is Visa Debit. Id. at 3.8.
162 Id. at 3.53 (showing that these schemes resemble the schemes for Visa and
MasterCard in the U.S., but not necessarily American Express and Discover).
163 Id. at 3.54.
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like the U.S., the U.K. credit card schemes participate in what is
known as dual governance, or mutual governance as it is called in the
U.K.16 4 With mutual governance, most of the large banks in England
sit on the boards of most of the credit card payment schemes. 16 The
Cruickshank Report concluded that intense competition between the
credit cards schemes is unlikely since all banks have a stake in what
each credit cards66 association is reaping, to include increased
interchange fees. 1
The interchange fees in the U.K. work the same as in the U.S.
where the acquiring bank pays a fee to the issuing bank. 167 The
acquiring bank, therefore, collects the fee paid to the issuing bank
from the retailer, who essentially pays the interchange fee." The
fees are determined by cost studies and decided upon by the
At the time of the Cruickshank Report,
association members.
interchange fees in the U.K. were most problematic with the Visa and
MasterCard associations. 170 These fees, however, remained secret and
were not provided to Mr. Cruickshank during his review. 171 Based on
the credit card costs and other information provided to Cruickshank,
the Report revealed that more than costs are involved in setting the
interchange default rate. 172 This information lead the Report to
conclude that the interchange fees set by the credit card schemes
73
were higher than justified by the associations' cost recoveries.1
The Report explains several anti-competitive consequences of
setting high interchange fees. First, a higher interchange fee raises
164

See generally id. at 3.53-3.66 (describing mutual governance).

165 Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.64, tbl. 3.1 (noting that four of the largest
banks in the U.K. own 84.1% of the shares of MasterCard/Europay UK Ltd.).
166 See id. at 3.65 (noting that common governance and ownership inhibits
each association from promoting themselves at the expense of the other).
167 Id. at 3.102.
168

Id. at 3.103. Of course, the retailer will then pass these fees onto customers

through higher retail prices.
169 Id. at 3.102.
170

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.98.

7 Id. at 3.102.
Id. at 3.113. The default rate is the rate decided upon by the association
members. If retailers and association members decided to by-pass the default rate
they may do so and set their own rate of interchange, although 90% of interchange
fees that are paid are done so according to the default rate. Id. at 3.102.
.73Id. at 3.114.
172
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costs to retailers, precluding smaller retailers from accepting credit
cards. 174 This, in turn, makes them unable to compete with larger
retailers that can afford to pay the interchange fees. 175 Second, by
allowing inflated interchange fees, there is no incentive for issuers to
cut costs by increasing efficiency. 76 Additionally, higher interchange
77
fees increase card usage at the expense of other payment methods.1
Because the interchange fee is collected by the issuing bank, it
provides benefits to its customer, the cardholder, by creating
incentives such as bonus points or rebates. 178 In light of such
inducements, the cardholder has an incentive to use the card.
Meanwhile, a cash customer receives no such incentive,
except in the unlikely event that discounting cash purchases or
surcharging credit purchases is permitted or exercised.t 79 The cashpaying customer, therefore, is placed in the position of subsidizing
the card user by paying the collectively higher retail prices.' This
argument, which was accepted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
can be made with equal force in the United States where, in recent
years, credit card customers have received numerous perks and
incentives, such as spending rebates and frequent flier miles, to use
credit cards.
The Cruickshank Report called for an increase in
transparency. Consumers, the Report concluded, should know exactly
what they are paying for, including the interchange rates. 181 The
Report also called for a revision in the way the credit card schemes
are governed in order to increase innovative competition and inhibit
anti-competitive activities.' 82 The proposal would, in essence, require
an end to the practice of mutual governance as it is has been known.
The U.K. Treasury was pleased with Cruickshank's review of
the banking industry and assigned implementation of Cruickshank's

174
175

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.115.
Id.

176 Id. at 3.97, 3.116 (noting that, in essence, inefficient suppliers are protected
from what would happen to them in the condition of full competition).
177

Id. at 3.117.

178

id.

179 Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.117.
180 Id.

181 Id. at 3.191.
182

Id.at 3.192.
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The OFT has

the task of requiring banks to open the market to competition, ensure
that the credit card networks are not hindering new competition, and
184
also require that interchange fees be based on, inter alia, costs.
In February 2003, the OFT issued a Preliminary Conclusion
regarding MasterCard's interchange fees.' 85 In its report, the OFT
concluded that the agreement to set common interchange fees among
MasterCard's members simply led to higher fees being paid to
issuing banks, which in turn acted as a tax on retail transactions, and
therefore, violated the anti-competition laws.186 The OFT did not find
that the interchange fee itself was anti-competitive, but that
MasterCard's lack of disclosure regarding the purpose for setting the
fee at such a high level was unacceptable.' 87 In its conclusion, the
OFT provided guidance on what MasterCard could include in the
calculation of the interchange fee.1 88 The OFT stated that the
interchange fee could be based on costs, and should only include
those costs that relate to processing transactions 89 and that bestow a
benefit to consumers. 19 The OFT demanded that MasterCard justify
whether its current interchange fees comply with191anti-competitive
laws or make adjustments to come into compliance.

183 HM-TREASURY, NEWSROOM & SPEECHES, REGULATOR TO ENSURE A

at
http://www.hmCUSTOMERS,
FOR
BANK
DEAL
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom-and-speeches/press/2000/press-148_00.cfm (Dec. 21,
BETTER

2000); see also HM-TREASURY, NEWSROOM & SPEECHES, BANKING COMPETITION
TO DELIVER BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS: GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO CRUICKSHANK

REPORT (Aug. 4, 2000) (on file with author).
'84 Id. (noting that interchange fees may also include in its costs the offering of
better and cheaper services).

185 OFFICE

OF

FAIR

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
186

Id. at Summary.

187

Id. at 6-8.

TRADING,

MASTERCARD

INTERCHANGE

FEES:

(2003).

'88 Id. at 7.
189

Id.

at 7. The Office of Fair Trading ("OFT') included in its test for

allowing processing costs those costs associated with improving the proliferation of
cards and advancing economical and technological progress. Id. at 5.
'90

OFFICE OFFAIRTRADING,

191

Id. at 13.

supra note 185, at 7.
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2. Australia
The United Kingdom is not the only country to begin
regulating the interchange fees. Australia has also begun a regiment
of regulation, and their model of regulating the interchange fee is
such that it may translate well in other countries' credit card
markets. 192 In 2000, the same year that the Cruickshank Report came
out in the United Kingdom, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission ("ACCC") and the Reserve Bank of Australia
("RBA") published a study on debit and credit card interchange
fees. 193 The report called for a substantial reform of the setting of
interchange fees.' 94 In its executive summary, the report describes the
interchange fee as a means "to encourage growth of payment
networks by redistributing
revenues between participants to induce
' 95
them to join."'
In 2000, the average credit card per transaction interchange
fee in Australia was .95%. r 96 In the same year credit cards accounted
for twenty-four percent of all non-cash retail payments.' 97 Of the total
revenue earned by issuing banks, one-third constituted revenues from
the interchange fee, while about one-half came from credit card
interest on borrowed funds. 198 The interchange fees are set by an
agreement among the member
financial institutions and apply to all
99
credit card transactions.'
Like in the U.K. and the U.S., setting of the interchange fee in
Australia was a business secret, which made it difficult to assess the

192 See Gans & King, Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment

Systems, supra note 120, at 126.

&

193 AUSTRALIAN

COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
RESERVE
BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA: A STUDY
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS (2000).
'94 See generally id. (describing the issues and concerns facing the credit card
industry in Australia).
'9' Id.

at ii.

196

Id. at iii.

197

Id. At tbl. 2.1 (showing that only checks were higher at 27%).

198 AUSTRALIAN

COMPETITION AND CONSUMER

COMMISSION

&

BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA:
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS iii (2000).
'99

Id. at 1.
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reasonableness of the fees. 200 In 1992, a study was conducted by the
Prices Surveillance Authority and it concluded that credit card
interchange fees had not gone down even though technology had
improved, credit card operations were proliferating, and on-line
clearance capability had reduced credit card fraud.2° '
Credit cards were first introduced in Australia in 1974 with
the Bankcard, which was a collective effort of Australian banks.20 2
MasterCard and Visa made their Australian debut in the mid
1980s. 20 3 American Express has recently arrived in Australia, but
only commands a small percentage of the credit card market. 20 4 In
2000, Visa held 51.4% of credit cards on issue, while MasterCard and
Bankcard had 22.7% and 19.2% respectively. 205 The credit card
network
works essentially the same in Australia as in the U.S. and the
206
U.K.

As a network start-up tool, the interchange fee is effective.20 7
Because issuers bear a large burden of the set-up costs of the
network, from providing the technological means needed to operate
the system to enticing merchants and potential cardholders to join the
network, merchants will shift some of their profits made from
accepting the credit cards to the issuing banks in attempt to balance
the market.20 8 The acquiring institution will only participate and pay
the interchange fee so long as its costs, to include payment of the
interchange 2fee,
are less than the revenues it makes from merchant
09
service fees.
In Australia, at the time of the ACCC and RBA study, issuing
200 Id.
201

Id. at 2.

202

Id. at 15.

203 AUSTRALIAN

COMPETITION AND CONSUMER

COMMISSION &

BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA:
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS 15 (2000).
204

RESERVE

A

STUDY

Id. at 15, tbl. 2.3.

205 Id. at tbl. 2.3 (noting that the remaining percentage was held by American
Express credit and charge card, and Diners Club).
206 See id. at 18.

207

See id. at 25-27.

208 AUSTRALIAN

COMPETITION AND

CONSUMER

COMMISSION

&

BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA:
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS 25-27 (2000).
209

Id. at 26.
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and acquiring of credit cards earned revenues well above the costs of
the network. 210 One-third of the revenues earned came from
interchange fees. 211 Not only was there no transparency in the setting
of interchange fees in Australia, but there were also no formal
methods established for reviewing interchange fees once set.212 The
study suggested two ways in which an interchange fee could be
determined.213 The first approach would allow the financial
institution that is providing the service to recover costs from the
beneficiaries of the service, generally the merchants.2 14 Applied to
credit card schemes, acquirers and issuers would first collect
whatever costs are permissible directly from merchants and
cardholders; then those costs that still remain between the acquirers
and issuers should be shared.215 Three costs should be included in the
calculation: costs for funding the interest-free period, costs associated
216
with guaranteeing funds, and costs incurred during processing.
The second approach looks at revenues earned by issuers and
acquirers to determine if their respective revenues may cover the
costs for both. 217 This type of mechanism would take into
consideration the total revenues and costs, as opposed to the
individual revenues and costs of the issuers and acquirers, and would
distribute revenues to cover all costs associated with the operation of
the network as a whole.2 18 In practice, whichever party earns excess

revenues will pay an interchange fee to the party that does not meet
210 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION

AND CONSUMER COMMISSION & RESERVE

BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA: A STUDY
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS, at 44 (explaining that average costs were

$1.93 per transaction, while revenues averaged $2.69 per transaction-leaving an
over cost amount of $0.76, which equates to 39% of the transaction cost).
211

Id.

212

Id. at 46.

Id. at 29 (qualifying that the actual setting of an interchange fee would
depend on the set-up of the actual payment network). These possibilities are not
213

exhaustive and do not take into consideration the capital committed by the parties

of the network. Id. at 30.
214

Id.

215 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION & RESERVE
BANK OF AUSTRALIA, DEBIT AND CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA: A STUDY
OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND ACCESS, at 29-30.
216

Id. at 46-47.

217

Id. at 30.

218

Id.
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costs, and the interchange fee will be determined by the shortfall of
the latter party. 219 Applying either of these two methods would have
had the effect of a lower interchange fee in 2000.
Upon publication of the Australian study, the RBA announced
three reform measures that should occur with the credit card payment
systems. 22 First, the RBA should introduce a system that would force
open the market to new entrants interested in issuing cards or
servicing merchants.22 ' Second, and similar to the outcome of the
Cruickshank Report, the RBA should require a cost-based method for
calculating the interchange fees. 222 Finally, the RBA should require
elimination of the no-surcharge rule so that merchants may recover
directly from cardholders their costs for accepting the cards, rather
than penalizing all paying customers.223
After receiving scholarly suggestions on how the credit card
interchange fee should be calculated, the RBA ultimately created its
own model that the credit card companies should use to calculate the
fee.2 24 In its approach to regulating the interchange fee, the RBA
decided that only costs incurred by issuers and that relate to payment
processing should be included in the fee. 225 These costs would
include authorizing and processing the credit card transactions,
eliminating and preventing fraud, and funding for the interest free
219 Id.

220 AUSTRALIAN

RELEASES,

COMPETITION

ACCC WELCOMES

AND

RESERVE

CONSUMER
BANK

CREDIT

http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemld/88157

COMMISSION,
CARD

MEDIA

REFORMS,

at

(last visited June 3,

2005).
221 id.
222 id.

Id. This allows intended beneficiaries to benefit from card usage, and
releases cash paying customers from their obligation to subsidize card users by
paying the same retail prices as those card users. Id.
224 See RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN
AUSTRALIA IV: FINAL REFORMS AND REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT (2002), at
http://www.rba.gov.au/PaymentsSystem/PaymentsPolicylReforms/CreditCardSche
mes/FinalReforms/index.html (last visited June 3, 2005) [hereinafter REFORM OF
CREDIT CARD SCHEMES]; See Gans & King, Approaches to Regulating Interchange
Fees in Payment Systems, supra note 120, at 128. Gans and King's article provides
a summary of the approaches the RBA considered in regulating the Interchange
Fee. ILd.
223

225

Gans & King, Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment

Systems, supra note 120, at 128;
224, at 37.
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supra note
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period.
These regulations will have the effect of increasing
transparency in the credit card schemes so that merchants and
consumers are aware of the costs associated with the efficient
operation of the credit card networks as opposed to trying to guess
whether the credit card banking members are simply running away
with excessive profits.
Since the reforms imposed by the RBA went into effect in
2003 and 2004, the interchange fee for credit cards has fallen thirtyfive basis points and this has been reflected in fees passed onto
merchants.
The average merchant service fee in 1999 was
approximately 1.8% of the transaction value; however, by July of
2004 that fee had fallen to approximately 1.05% of transaction
value. 228 Additionally, in questioning merchants, the RBA has
learned that much competition has erupted between merchants and
their banks and offers received by other bank to lower merchant
229
fees.
Although
early to
its seems
as though
regulating the
interchange
fee in still
Australia
hastell,
produced
a positive
outcome.
3. Israel
Presently, there are three large credit card companies in Israel:
Isracard, Israel Credit Cards ("ICC"), and Leumi card.
All three
companies issue Visa and MasterCard credit cards, while Isracard is
the only issuer and acquirer of the Isracard and American Express,

226

Gans & King, Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment

Systems, supra note 120, at 128; REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES, supra note

224, at 37. There was much debate over whether the RBA would include the
funding of the interest-free period because they concluded that it is not a direct
benefit to all consumers of the credit card market, but an exclusive benefit to
cardholders. Gans & King, Approaches to Regulating InterchangeFees in Payment

Systems, supra note 120, at 128. The RBA ultimately decided that the interest-free
period does benefit merchants by allowing customers to purchase items on credit if
cash is not readily available, which allows merchant to make sales they otherwise
may not have made. Id. at 141.
227 RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA BULLETIN,
MERCHANT

SERVICE

FEES

FOR

CREDIT

CARDS

10

(2004),

at

http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu-jul04/bu_0704_2.pdf.
228 Id. at 11.
229

Id. at 12.

230 Yossi Spiegel, The Credit Card Industry in Israel, Preliminary Note

Written for a Panel Presentation, 1-2 (June 2002) (on file with author).
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and ICC is the only issuer and acquirer of Diners Club.23 ' In 2001,
Isracard possessed 47% of the market share, ICC possessed 31.8% of
the market, and Leumi card possessed 15.3% of the market,
the
232
remaining 5.9% was held by smaller credit card companies.
Credit card use in Israel is different from most other countries
in that credit cards are linked directly to bank accounts.233 Because
cards are linked to bank accounts, most cardholders carry cards
issued from their banking institution. 234 With such credit card and
bank account arrangements, Israelis are more likely to use credit
cards for purchases. Credit cards are used in three separate ways.23 6
The default use of credit cards is to have the cardholder's bank
account debited for the full amount of the card balance at the end of
the month. 237 Merchants may also allow cardholders to make interest
free installments, in which case the merchant provides the credit.238
Finally, the cardholder may ask the merchant to qualify the purchase
as a "credit transaction" so that the cardholder may make installment
payments to the credit card company while paying interest on the
carried-over unpaid portions. 239 Because credit cards are so popular
and commonly used in Israel, merchants generally will not surcharge
for credit
card transactions, even though they are legally permitted to
240
do

SO.

In establishing the structure of the current credit card industry
in Israel, the Israeli Antitrust Authority ("IAA") plays two major
231

Id. at 2.

232

Id. at tbl. 1.

See id. at 3. (noting that credit cards in Israel are tied to bank accounts;
however, the Israel Antitrust Authority began prohibiting tying arrangements
between bank accounts and credit cards in September 2001 although the industry
hasn't appeared to change much).
233

234

Id. at 5-6.

235

Spiegel, supra note 230, at 4 (noting that one-quarter to one-third

consumption spending is paid with credit cards).
236

Id. at 5.

237

id.

Id. (stating that the total amount of these types of merchant provided credit
card transactions account for nearly one-quarter of all credit card transactions).
239 Id. (qualifying that the installment is set by the cardholder and usually
238

spans 3 to 36 installments).
240 See Spiegel, supra note 230, at 6 (stating merchants are reluctant to impose
surcharges for fear of causing a decrease in sales).
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roles. 24 1 First, the director of the IAA has the authority to label a firm
or a concentrated group of firms as monopolists. 242 While the director
has not declared this industry, or any one credit card company to be a
monopolist, the threat of his doing so gives him great power over the
structure of the industry. 243 The second major role of the IAA is a
result of the director declaring that the interchange fee is a
"restrictive arrangement," in which case any interchange agreement
requires approval by the Court for Trade Restrictions. As a general
rule, the Court approves such fees including any restrictions proposed
by the director.24 Interchange fees did not begin in Israel until 1998,
when banks began to act as acquiring banks for merchants and an
arrangement became necessary with issuing banks to clear
transactions. 246 Because the Court for Trade Restrictions is legally
required to seek the opinion of the director of the IAA before making
a decision on interchange fees, the IAA is quite involved in the
setting of these fees.24 7
The interchange fee causes controversy in Israel.248 It lacks
24'

See Spiegel, supra note 230, at 2.

242

id.

243

Id. For example, this power retained by the director of the IAA allowed

him to require Isracard to give up its exclusive right to issue MasterCard, and also
caused Isracard to acquire and issue Visa cards. Id.
244 Id. See also, THE ANTITRUST AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT ON
POLICY
2001
at
http://80.70.129.121/aboutus/aboutus-english.asp?subid=+Annual+Report+on+Co
mpetition+Policy+2001. By declaring the interchange fee a restrictive arrangement,
under Israeli law, restrictive arrangements must be approved by the Court in order
to proceed. Id. In practice, the credit card participants would come up with an
arranged fee and present it to the Court, the Court would then ask the director of the
IAA for his position regarding the set fee, and would then render a decision on
whether the fee is legal and satisfactory or restrictive and anti-competitive. Id. at
2,6. This, therefore, gives the IAA director great power over the setting of the
interchange fee.
245 Spiegel, supra note 230, at 2 (explaining that one condition imposed by the
director required that Leumi card and ICC issue and acquire MasterCard in order
for approval of their interchange agreement).
COMPETITION

246 Id. at 7. Prior to this time, banks issued their credit cards and also signed up
merchants in a market where credit cards were concentrated in few banks and
nearly all transactions were "on us" transactions. Id.
247

Id.

Lawsuits have been brought against credit card companies claiming that
they are abusing their powers in charging exorbitant fees. See Assaf Bergerfreund
248

2005]

Antitrust Law and the Credit Card Interchange Fee

483

neutrality in Israel for two reasons: 249 (1) because merchants do not
charge surcharges to credit card users they are not necessarily
reimbursed for the merchant fees that they pay; 25° and (2) because
issuers essentially have a captured market it is not necessary for them
to provide rebates and other deals to cardholders, and as a result there
is no justification for a large interchange fee. 251 Therefore, Israel does
not support a market regulation of interchange fee, but allows the
director of the IAA to regulate the fee that is being charged to
acquiring banks and ensure that it is justified and warranted in the
Israeli economy. 252
The credit card system used in Israel would probably not
work in the U.S. for a couple of reasons. First, the use of credit cards
has increased in the U.S. likely due to the rebates and incentives
offered by credit card issuers. If cardholders lacked the incentives, as
is the case in Israel, then they may consider using debit cards or other
forms of payments. Additionally, the majority of credit card users in
the United States carry monthly balances, and in Israel this is the
exception rather than the rule.
4. Italy
Unlike Israel where credit cards are commonly used, Italy is a
predominantly cash-based economy. 253 In 2001, Italy only had 20
million credit cards in circulation. 254 Prior to the introduction of the
interchange fee in Italy, most interchange arrangements were paperbased and negotiated bilaterally between issuing and acquiring

& Eli Daniel, Tel Aviv Court Approves NIS 1 Billion Class Action Against Credit
Card Firms, HA'ARETZ (Jan. 30, 2003) (stating that a class action was approved
against the credit card companies claiming that they are charging excessive fees)
(on file with author).
249 Id.

250 Spiegel, supra note 230, at 9.
251 id.
252 Id.

253 Guerino Ardizzi & G. Coppola, The Italian Case Study: InterchangeFee,
Market Structure and Cost Efficiency in the Retail Payment System, paper read at
conference on "The Economics of Payment Networks," IDEI Universite' de
Toulouse 2 (June 2002).
254 Id. (noting that in Italy the cashless payments per-capita in 1999 were 45 in
Italy, 370 in the United States, and 110 in Europe).
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255

The

interchange fee in Italy did not appear until 1986 when the Italian
Bankers' Association ("ABI") was given the task of determining a
multilateral interchange fee.256 The intent of the multilateral
interchange fee was to lower transaction costs by moving away from
bilaterally 257negotiated interchange situations to centralizing
settlement.

In setting the interchange fee for credit cards, the ABI set an
ad valorem fee, in a percentage of each transaction amount, to cover
items such as authorization, settlement, trademark, and credit
disputes. 258 The interchange fee is calculated on full cost basis, which
combines direct and indirect costs per unit to generate the total. 25 26A0
mark-up is then added to account for return on capital invested.
Like other economies, the interchange fee in Italy is passed on to the
merchants. 26 1 Under the ad valorem setting of the interchange fee, the
higher the volume of sales obtained by the merchant, the more that
will be paid in interchange fees and the more revenues earned for
acquiring and issuing institutions.262 Time will tell whether Italy will
require a formal regulation of the interchange fee as cards become
more commonplace.
5. The European Union
In addition to the interchange issues faced by the countries
described above, the European Union has also been required to
consider the ill-effects of the credit card interchange fee. 263 In 2002,
the Commission of the European Communities had to determine
whether the multilateral interchange fee for intra-regional

255

Ardizzi & Coppola, supra note 253, at 3.

256 Id.
257

Id. (explaining, however, that there is still no real-time settlement in the

retail payment system for credit card transactions in Italy).
258 Id. (noting that the rate is the same across the board for merchants, there is
no differential for supermarkets versus retailers, for example).
259 Id.
260

Ardizzi & Coppola, supra note 253, at 3.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 4.

263

Commission Decision 2002, supra note 38, at 25.
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transactions was harmful to consumers. 264 In its assessment of the
multilateral interchange fee, the Commission determined that the fee
was excessive and should be recalculated so that the fees are based on
costs incurred by issuers.2 65 In requiring increased transparency, the
Commission stated that Visa must base the calculation of its
interchange fee on processing costs, the cost of the interest free
period, and the cost of guaranteeing payment.266 Additionally, Visa
must provide this information to merchants if requested.267 Therefore,
Visa may no longer keep this cost information hidden as a business
secret, but must disclose such information for the benefit of
competition.

V. Antitrust Issues Facing Interchange Fees in the
United States
This section will revisit the NaBANCO case to determine
whether the market definitions used in 1984 still make sense, and
whether the interchange fee in the United States, after all of these
years, can still be considered "pro-competitive in nature. 268
The behavior exhibited by Visa and MasterCard in the raising
of interchange fees and maintaining control of the credit card
industry, provides evidence that Visa and MasterCard are
monopolists in the credit card market. The two associations have
created an enormous credit card industry where they have maintained
their positions as leaders and giants. In order to establish the
monopolistic position held by Visa and MasterCard, a two part test
must be met.769 First, monopoly power must be held by Visa and
264

Id. at 18. This case was brought by EuroCommerce, an organization in the

European Union that retails, wholesales and acts as an international trade
representative. Id. EuroCommerce claimed that the elevated multilateral
interchange fees did nothing more than cause merchants and consumers to pay for
benefits received by cardholders, and that the price fixing scheme amounted to no
more than a price-fixing cartel. Id. at (L 318) 21. Intra-regional transactions include
those transactions where a cardholder from one EEA country makes a purchase in
another EEA country. Id.
265

Id. at 20.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268

NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1259-61.

269

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (2001), cert. denied 534

U.S. 952 (2001), aff'd 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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MasterCard in the relevant market.27 ° In making this determination,
the relevant market must first be defined; then it must be determined
whether Visa and MasterCard have power in that market. 271 The
second part of the monopolization test is the "willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident."272 In proving the second element, the
plaintiff must show that Visa and MasterCard engaged in
exclusionary conduct that harmed the competitive process, which in
turn harmed consumers.273 However, Visa and MasterCard would
have the opportunity to proffer pro-competitive reasons for
274 their
effects.
anti-competitive
any
offset
to
used
be
may
that
actions
A. Visa and MasterCard Have Power in the Relevant Market
1. The Relevant Product and Geographic Markets
Most antitrust analyses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
begin by defining the relevant product and geographic markets.275
The relevant product market will contain those products that are
reasonably interchangeable, 276 and include the range of substitutes
that are significant enough to determine if the potential offender has
market power. 277 For example, the relevant market defined in the
NaBANCO case included all types of payments used in retail sales
because at that time it was believed that any type of payment was
substitutable for any other type of payment.
In other words, cash
could be easily and conveniently substituted for a credit card. This
ease and convenience of customer substitutability is critical to the

270

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50.

271

Id. at 50-56.

272

Id. at 50.

273

Id. at 58-59.

274

Id. at 59.

275

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).

276

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 218-19
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
278 NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1259.
277
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determination of the relevant market.279
Another test employed to determine the relevant market is
contained in the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The
Guidelines basically include within the market any firm that could, if
a monopolist, impose a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase-generally five percent.
In other words, a profitmaximizer selling all the products within a market can impose a price
higher than what is competitive
without losing sales to make the price
28 1
increase unprofitable.
In such an illustration, if Visa and MasterCard increase their
interchange pricing for credit cards to levels that are higher than what
may be considered competitive, and lose no consumers or merchants
in the process, then the market would be defined as the credit card
market. If, however, Visa and MasterCard increase their interchange
levels, and the use of cash increases enough to force the fee back
down, then cash would be included in the relevant market. 282 As will
be noted below, since the NaBANCO decision, the use of other retail
payments in lieu of credit cards has not been significant even with the
interchange increases.
In NaBANCO, the defined market included all retail payment
methods, such as cash, checks, store cards, charge cards, traveler's
cheques, and credit cards.2 83 In defining the market in this manner,
Visa had less than five percent of the market share.284 The markets
defined in Visa U.S.A., which are the market for general purpose card
network services and the market for general purpose credit cards,
represent a more realistic view of the current situation.285 Because the
interchange fee is paid by the merchant, via the acquiring bank, it is

279 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

351 U.S. at 394-96, 404.

United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed.Reg. 41552, 41557 (Sept. 10, 1992).
281 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).
282 The use of cash may increase, for example, if merchants offer discounts for
using cash or if they discontinue credit acceptance.
281 NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1259 (adding other types of payment options
not listed here).
280

284

Id.

285 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
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centralized in the credit card market. 286 In Visa U.S.A., the court
found that consumers did not find store cards, debit cards, cash,
check, or other
types of payment mechanisms to be substitutes for
28 7
credit cards.
A similar decision was reached by the European Commission
in 2002.288 The Commission determined that the relevant markets for
analyzing the multilateral interchange fee included the network
market and the market for all types of payment cards.28 9 Because so
many retail shops accept credit cards, and have made it easy for
consumers to use them by providing credit card swipe machines at
the register, consumers are no longer compelled to carry a checkbook
or cash. They may simply use their credit cards and opt to pay the
balance upon receipt of their statement, or pay the balance over
time-these options are not available with a check or cash. Therefore,
the relevant markets are the general purpose credit card market and
the market for credit card network systems.
After defining the relevant product market, the geographic
market must be defined. 290 Although the interchange fee is used
worldwide, each country has control over whether or not to monitor
the interchange fees that are charged. 291 As previously discussed, fees
should be based on costs and would depend on the network effects
established in each individual country. For example, credit cards in a
country such as Poland are not as common as in the U.S., and
interchange fees may be higher in Poland to offset the costs of
establishing a healthy network of users. Because the need for
Although an interchange fee is usually paid with debit card transactions,
and countries that have begun to regulate the credit card interchange fees are also
regulating debit interchange fees, I am confining the scope of this paper to credit
card interchange fees because interchange fees paid for debit transactions are
generally paid differently and involve different economic analysis. Balto, The
Problem of Interchange Fees, supra note 2; Balto, Creating a Payment System
Network, supra note 70, Jocelyn Donze and Isabelle Dubec, Access Pricing in
Shared ATM Networks, Working Paper-Preliminary Version (May 20, 2002);
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 120.
17 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 336-37 (using testimony of Professor
Katz,
an expert witness of the government and Professor of Economics and Business
Administration at the University of California at Berkley, the court accepted that
consumers prefer credit and charge cards to other forms of payment).
288 Commission Decision 2002, supra note 38, at 25.
286

289

Id. at 25-26.

Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 339-340.
291 See supra Part IV.C. (discussing interchange fees in different countries).
290
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interchange fees is greater in some countries over others, each
country must be responsible for the monitoring of such fees. In the
U.S., one interchange fee is set for the entire nation, not localized by
state. Therefore, in this analysis the geographic market is the United
States.
2. Market Power
A firm has market power if it is able to control prices or
292
Evidence of this
eliminate competition without losing business.
power must be displayed through specific actions proving the firms
ability to control prices or eliminate competition.2 93 However, even if
there is no direct evidence that a firm can control prices, market
power may be assumed if the firm has a substantial share of a
concentrated market and there are excessive barriers to entry into the
market.2 9 4
In NaBANCO, the court determined that neither Visa nor
MasterCard possessed market power, due mainly to the fact that the
relevant market included all payment systems such as cash, checks
and other forms of payment. NaBANCO also determined that there
296
NaBANCO contrasts
was ease of entry into the marketplace.
greatly with the more recent Visa, U.S.A. decision. The relevant
market was narrowed to include only general purpose credit cards
With a more narrow market,
and the credit card network systems.
that
MasterCard and Visa have
determined
the court accurately
29 8
market power.
In the past seven years, MasterCard and Visa have each been
on an interchange fee raising spree, thus creating many double raises
in rates to acquirers. When Visa or MasterCard raise interchange
fees, they generally do not lose merchant customers because

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995).
293 K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 129.
292
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NaBANCO, 596 F. Supp. at 1259.
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Id. (noting that entry was possible and was demonstrated by the entrance of

ATM networks into the market).
297 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'd, 344 F.3d. 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 45 (2004).
298 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 342.

490

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:4

merchants cannot afford to lose customers that pay with credit
cards. 299 Because both the United Kingdom and Australia have
decided to regulate the interchange fee, this may suggest that the
purpose of the fee is not to offset costs, as MasterCard and Visa
would have the market accept, but instead the fee is to increase
revenues and profits for the association members.
In 1999, Visa possessed about forty-seven percent of credit
and charge card transactions based on dollar volume, MasterCard
possessed about twenty-six percent. 300 Together Visa and MasterCard
accounted for about seventy-three percent of the credit card sales
volume. 30 1 As measured by cards issued, Visa and MasterCard
together controlled approximately eighty-five percent of the
302
market..
For credit and charge card volume, American Express and
30 3
Discover controlled twenty percent and six percent respectively.
The court in Visa U.S.A. determined that market share controlled by
Visa and MasterCard allowed them to charge excessive interchange
fees since merchants are essentially obligated to accept the cards
because their customers insist on using them.30 4
Not only do Visa and MasterCard hold a substantial share of
the credit and charge card markets, but there are also high barriers to
market entry. Under the DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, ease of
entry into the market place is defined as having potential entrants
likely to enter the market in a timely fashion, and the entry will be
profitable. 30 5 Evidence presented in the Visa U.S.A. case disclosed
that for a new entrant to enter the credit card market it must be
willing to invest over $1 billion. 306 New entrants would also have to
convince merchants and cardholders to accept and use the new credit
card in order to create appropriate network effects. 307 A new entrant
299

Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 340.

'00 Id. at 341.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 id.

Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
305 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed.Reg. 41552, 41561 (Sept. 10, 1992).
306 Visa U.S.A., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 341-42 (stating that other sources
said that
entering the credit card network would cost between $2 billion and $5 billion
(citing Dahar [Visa U.S.A.] Dep. at 200-01)).
307 Id. at 342.
304
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would have to obtain twenty to twenty-five percent of the market
share in order to succeed.3 °8
With the significant MasterCard and Visa market shares, and
the high barriers to entry, both associations have market power in
both the general purpose card market and in the credit card network
systems market. ° 9 Both have raised the interchange fee without
loosing a significant number of merchants and have created a credit
card network making entry by other potentially new credit card
companies nearly impossible.
B. MasterCard and Visa Willfully Acquired and Maintained
Their Market Power
To violate the Sherman Act, market power must be
accompanied by some form of abusive, exclusionary or anticompetitive conduct. 310 This paper does not claim that the
interchange fee is per se illegal. Rather, the interchange fee has been
used to "harm the competitive process, and thereby harm
consumers." 31' If prima facie evidence of anti-competitive harm is
established, then Visa and MasterCard may introduce procompetitive justifications to explain their behavior. 312 If the
associations provide sufficient evidence that their actions are procompetitive, then the burden would return to the plaintiff to rebut any
efficiencies claimed by the associations.313 If the pro-competitive
justifications stand against the plaintiff's rebuttal, then the plaintiff
may attempt to show that the anti-competitive
harm actually
3 14
outweighs the pro-competitive claims.
When introduced, the interchange fee served the purpose of
offsetting the costs of establishing a credit card network by providing
issuing banks with revenues to expand their card base. It also helped
the Visa and MasterCard associations establish technologically savvy
settlement mechanisms-computerized clearing house systems, for

308
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309
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310 Id.
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United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (2001) (emphasis in the

original).
312 Microsoft, 253 F. 3d at 59.
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example. The revenues earned by interchange fees to establish a
credit card network can be justified. This justification is not very
convincing once the network is up-and-running, and the costs of its
operation are down, particularly when the interchange fee has
continued to rise. 31 5 In 1999, credit card interchange fees exceeded
$10 billion.3 1 6 The raise in interchange fees by Visa and MasterCard
in 1998 and 1999 resulted in a collective raise to merchants of over
$300 million a year.3 17 While Visa and MasterCard argued that their
interchange fees increased because of
costs, no information was
318
revealed to explain the increased costs.
When the interchange fee increases, issuers receive more
revenues. Acquiring banks must pay more to issuing banks, causing
merchants to pay more to acquiring banks, and ultimately raise retail
prices. Consumers are generally harmed by a rise in retail prices.
When issuing banks receive profits that exceed their costs, they
generally pass this excess on to their card-carrying customers via
special rebates and royalties, such as zero percent financing and
airline miles. 319 If indeed Visa and MasterCard based their
interchange fees on costs, issuing banks could not likely afford to
offer substantial rebates, frequent flyer miles, or attractive financing.
Those essentially benefiting from increased interchange fees,
therefore, are people who qualify for and use credit cards, and their
issuing banks.
Those harmed by these fee hikes include cardholders by
paying increased retail prices, non-cardholders who also pay
increased retail prices, merchants who lose by either paying higher
merchant discount fees or discontinuing acceptance of Visa and
MasterCard (which is not a realistic option for most merchants), and
acquiring banks who do not participate in "on us" transactions and
therefore must pay a higher interchange fee. Although acquiring
banks generally receive full reimbursement from merchants for the
interchange fee, some acquiring banks may end up losing merchant
customers if they go out of business because they can no longer
afford the increased interchange fee. Also, although this increased fee
is passed along to cardholders through rebates and incentives, many
315
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consumers may prefer lower overall retail prices; however,
cardholders were not asked which they prefer prior to the fee hikes.
In looking at the interchange fee from an international
perspective, the United Kingdom found the fee to be anticompetitive
and therefore regulated it. ° The same is true of Australia. 32 1 In
practice, the interchange fee in Israel and Italy are regulated and
monitored to ensure that they are based on costs and are not
excessive. 322 Other still developing credit card systems such as
Poland may need to have the credit card system unregulated and
allow the interchange fee to adequately establish the network system
before determining whether to regulate. However, in the United
States, where the credit card interchange fee was introduced and has
proliferated, it has also continued to increase, its calculation has
remained a secret, and has gone unchecked by any sort of regulation
or market basis.
The credit card interchange fee stifles competition.
Competition is reduced among issuing banks since there is no
incentive for them to experiment with other credit card networks
because the elevated interchange fee offered by the Visa and
MasterCard systems provide them generous profits. This may change
as a result of the Visa, U.S.A. decision and as displayed with the
partnership between MBNA, Corp. and American Express. Although
banks that agree to issue cards other than Visa and MasterCard will
likely look for an attractive interchange rate at the negotiating table.
Why would issuers go elsewhere when Visa and MasterCard
maintain the largest credit card system and offer the most attractive
interchange fees?
Interchange fees harm merchants because unless a merchant
wants to lose a large portion of its customers, accepting Visa and
MasterCard remains a high cost of doing business and a convenience
to customers not easily replaced. As a result of the network effects,
merchants cannot afford to lose their credit card customers, and
therefore, take the hit and pay the increased interchange fee.
Consumers are harmed because they must pay the larger
interchange fees in higher prices; although non-cardholders are
paying the most, cardholders also pay higher retail prices. Because

320

Cruickshank, supra note 60, at 3.44.

321 See
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merchants are not allowed to surcharge credit card purchases and
they choose not to discount cash purchases, all consumers pay the
inflated price for goods spurred by higher interchange rates.32
The justifications that Visa and MasterCard gave for their
increased interchange fees are increases in costs and increases in
incentives for issuers and merchants. 324 Merchants do not seem to be
aided or impressed by the interchange hikes. 325 Therefore, because
interchange fees are not based solely on costs, and since merchants
are not being enhanced by the fees, the fees seem beneficial only to
the pocketbooks of issuing banks and some cardholders. From this
information it would appear that the pro-competitive effects of the
credit card interchange fee are not outweighing the harm done to
consumers, merchants and acquirers.
Visa and MasterCard have monopoly power in the credit card
market. Their activities regarding the interchange fees, therefore,
should be monitored and more transparent so that a more accurate
determination can be made regarding whether the fee indeed has any
purpose other than inflating profits. This article does not assume the
position that the solution to the interchange fee problem is to declare
it unlawful, yet the fee's transparency to its consumers and payers
should be argued. This was the decision in the United Kingdom and
Australia. 3266
Visa and MasterCard would put up an arduous fight if
regulation to control the interchange fee was recommended in the
United States, although, regulation may not be essential. If Visa and
MasterCard displayed more transparency in the setting of the
interchange fee, merchants would have more ammunition to decide
whether to pay the entire interchange fee, and in lieu of government
regulation, the credit card associations may continue to maintain
some control over the setting the fee. This control may not remain the
case if the interchange fee is forced into regulation because the
networks are hiking fees out of control. Transparency would also
give merchants and acquirers more leverage in determining whether
the fee is justified. If merchants gain more leverage in this respect
If the no-surcharge rule was declared illegal, then non-card-paying
customers would not be paying as much of the increased interchange fee-that is,
of course, if the merchant decided to actually charge differing prices.
324 Balto, Creatinga Payment System Network, supra note 70, at 1395-96.
323
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and the credit card associations choose not to lower fees, then
merchants may come together to file lawsuits in situations where fees
charged are excessive or frivolous.
A recently published study predicted that there is a twenty
percent chance that litigation brought to combat the interchange fee
327
Presently, merchants
in the next five years would be successful.

have no idea what they are paying for, except that they are paying to
maintain their cardholding customers. Considering the recent WalMart settlement, merchants are becoming dissatisfied with sitting
around waiting for lower interchange fees. 3"2

VI. Conclusion
The credit card interchange fee has been analyzed and
questioned world-wide, and several suggestions have been made for
its economical calculation. The problem is that calculation of the
interchange fee has been a secret for Visa and MasterCard since their
cards' inceptions. In some industries this may not be problematic;
however, in the credit card industry where there are multiple players
and all are affected, either negatively or positively, by the consistent
increases in interchange fees, transparency is essential to avoid harm.
Some countries have required disclosure by regulating the calculation
of the interchange fee. In the United States, however, the interchange
fee is still under the secret blanket of the Visa and MasterCard
associations. This lack of transparency in the process of setting the
interchange fee has caused many to question the fee's purpose,
whether it is really a tool for covering costs and increasing
cardholders or whether it is simply a profit maximizer at the cost of
harming merchants and consumers. By requiring greater transparency
in the setting of the interchange fee, merchants may have the
information to determine whether or not the credit card associations
are acting anti-competitively or unfairly. If this is the case more
lawsuits by merchants may arise, and end up in settlement, ultimately
lowering interchange fees. Transparency would certainly change the
structure of the interchange fee, and candid justification to merchants
and consumers would accompany each new increase.
As monopolists of the credit card market, Visa and
MasterCard have controlled the setting of the interchange fee out of
view of the parties that it affects. In order to place a check on the

327 Attacking the Death Star, supra note 153, at 3.
328 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 280 F.3d 124 (2001).
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activities of Visa and MasterCard, the United States should move to
something closer to that practiced in the United Kingdom, Australia,
Italy, and Israel by requiring transparency in the setting of
interchange fees; however, unlike these other countries the setting of
the fee should remain market based and not necessarily regulated by
the banking or antitrust authorities.
In requiring a more fair interchange rate in the United States
that would benefit all parties, disclosure of the fee's calculation
should be made to a governing body, such as the Department of
Treasury or the Federal Trade Commission. If the calculation of the
fee is disclosed, then the credit card networks are more accountable
for the fees they are charging and the governing body can monitor the
distribution of the interchange fee to ensure that its initial purpose of
easing the burden to issuing institutions is fulfilled. To be fair to all
parties, the calculation of the interchange fee should be made public
annually so that the parties who are involved in paying the fee and
who are affected by the assessment of the fee can determine whether
the fees are excessive. After such determinations, retailers or
consumer groups may legally attack the interchange fees and would
have the numbers and justification to support such an attack.
While a proposed system of monitoring may seem like a
pseudo-regulation, the market forces would still be responsible for
the actual setting of the fee and the monitoring would simply keep the
credit card companies accountable for the costs included in the fee
calculation. In this case, the participants in the market keep the
interchange fee competitive. While monitoring the interchange may
seem acceptable to many involved in the network, a recent Morgan
Stanley Report makes a seventy percent prediction that the
interchange situation will continue on the status quo, but pressure
from merchants, to include 329
litigious threats, will level out the fee
without requiring a decrease.
While it may appear that the market presently determines the
interchange fee, this ideology is inaccurate because in the market of
issuers, cardholders, merchants and merchant acquirers, none of these
groups as a whole determines the actual setting of the interchange fee
in the Visa and MasterCard associations. Because cardholders,
merchants and merchant acquirers are at the mercy of the
associations, the only true market forces that determine the anticompetitive interchange fee are the credit card associations. And
thus, some type of checks and balances may be necessary to create an
interchange equilibrium.
329
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